Abstract-The advances of cloud computing, fog computing, and Internet of things (IoT) make industries more prosperous than ever. A wide range of industrial systems such as transportation and manufacturing systems have been developed by integrating cloud computing, fog computing, and IoT infrastructure successfully. However, in this sophisticated system, security and privacy issues are major concerns that hinder the widespread adoptions of these novel techniques. In this paper, we focus on assured data deletion, an issue that is important but received less attention in academia and industry. We first propose a framework to integrate the cloud, the fog, and the things together to manage stored data from industries or individuals. We then focus on secure data deletion in this framework by proposing an assured data deletion scheme that fulfills verifiable data deletion as well as flexible access control over sensitive data. Only data owners and fog devices are involved when deleting cloud data and validating the deletion of these data, which makes the protocol practical due to the features of low latency as well as real-time interaction with fog. The proposed protocol takes advantage of the attribute-based encryption, whose security can be proved under the standard model. The theoretical analysis shows good performance and functionality requirements while the Manuscript received November 30, 2017; revised February 24, 2018 and April 25, 2018; accepted May 22, 2018 implementation results demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal.
I. INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing [1] , a type of novel computing framework that provides on-demand services with shared processing resources computational devices, has made our lives more convenient and easier. For example, the cloud can turn a resource-constrained mobile device into a supercomputer, which means that we can get supercomputational power to analyze virtually any type of information wherever we are, from the cloud. As a result, people can benefit a lot by employing cloud computing services. We take software as a service as an instance. Currently, people are enjoying the convenient services provided by Google map, Facebook, Youtube, and so on. Cloud computing enjoys numerous merits, for example, savings in the cost of upgrades, easy scalability, flexibility in data access, regular backups, and disaster recovery. However, there exist two drawbacks namely security and centralization in cloud computing [2] .
Cloud computing clearly creates effective economies of scale by using simple centralized architectures. However, the traditional cloud computing centralization [3] - [5] , including centralized data storage and data processing, may lead to some limitations. The first limitation is the loss of privacy due to outsourcing data to a centralized server and the second one is centralization that may cause undesirable latency, weak mobility, and location awareness. These inherent problems of cloud computing might hamper human-centered designs, which allow blurring the boundaries between human and machines to emerge more interesting applications.
A large amount of data is produced by the network, especially at the edge devices, thus, it is more efficient to do computations on the data on edge devices. Several emerging techniques such as cloudlet and fog computing [6] have been developed since cloud computing is not always efficient enough to process data on the edge network. Fog computing is an emerging technology that can push the frontier of computing applications, data processing, and services out of the centralized data centers and down to the logical periphery of the network. This is extremely beneficial when considering the decreased pressure on the network bandwidth and communication latency.
Internet has provided so much convenience to our modern society. People in today's generation are relying on the Internet for many different tasks, e.g., work, entertainment, shopping, etc. It has been a common trend that electronic devices are equipped with Internet connection. Internet of things (IoT) [7] , an emerging topic discussed by academia and industry in this century, is a set of smart devices connected via the Internet to talk with each other. The applications and services running on IoT devices [8] , [9] are connected to the Internet and may need to send their collected data to powerful servers for processing or analytics. If these aggregated data are in huge volume and the processing task is time sensitive, the traditional centralized processing would cause a heavy burden on the network bandwidth and also may fail the real-time requirement considering the distance between the central data center and the requestor. Fog computing, instead, shifts the workloads away from the centralized data centers and clouds (i.e., "core" nodes) to the decentralized fog nodes deployed geographically near the IoT devices that requested for resources.
Fog computing, a novel computing framework, facilitates services between the edge devices and the cloud server [10] . The advantages of the fog computing such as low latency, real-time data processing, mobility support, and predominance of wireless access make it a suitable platform for applications in many domains, such as IoT, software-defined networks, wireless sensors, and actuators networks. In the framework of fog computing [6] , smart things are linked to fog devices. Fog devices are connected to each other and each of the fog devices can communicate with the cloud. The interactions between the cloud server and fog devices are quite many to make them work collaboratively, especially far data analysis and management.
By taking advantage of the increasing ubiquity of smart things of IoT [11] [12] , fog computing provides a powerful tool to construct industrial systems. For example, IoT has been adopted in the healthcare service industry to improve the healthcare service quality. In the healthcare scenario, medical sensors carried by patients monitor the parameters such as blood pressure and breathing activity that can be processed and provide guidance to the healthcare staff. Data privacy here is a major concern that hinders the general adoption of fog computing. For example, the data should be accessible only to authorized users for the reason that obtaining inaccurate and wrong medical data may lead to wrong treatments and it will cause privacy violation if everyone can access the data. Broadcast encryption [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] is a choice to achieve the goal that a ciphertext can be shared to several authorized users specified by data owners, but the data owner needs to know possible recipients in advance together with the authentication information of each recipient. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [17] , [18] is an extremely useful cryptographic tool to achieve flexible access control [19] - [22] , where the access structure can be built in the private key or the ciphertext. Users get the corresponding plaintext when their attributes meet the requirements of the access structure.
Besides flexible access control, data security is another concern in fog computing since a user can lose control over their outsourced data. Prior research mainly focusd on the existence of the data, i.e., data integrity, which has been well resolved. We investigate a complementary problem, that is, when a patient wants to delete his sensitive medical data from an outsourced storage, how can he guarantee the deleted data no longer appear on the condition that he does not delete these data by himself? The issue mentioned previously is well-recognized but received less attention than data integrity. A privacy-focused service may expect that the data can be deleted securely once they have submitted their request. The right to be forgotten promulgated by the European Union enforced companies to offer the service of secure data deletion to users. Meanwhile, an analog service was presented by California's legislation. Assured data deletion is a required demand in fog computing especially for the confidential data. However, secure data deletion is challenging since it is much harder to prove the nonexistence of outsourced data than to prove the existence of the data. The target for the assured data deletion [23] is to erase data from magnetic disks or other storage meduim, which is inaccessible after deletion so that malicious attackers cannot obtain them.
In the physical world, secure deletion can be realized easily: confidential documents are shredded, sensitive information of a file is selectively redacted. In the digital world, however, assured data deletion seems simple but there are many tough issues under the surface. It may be acceptable for users to destroy physical data storage, say incinerate and pulverize the disk, if the data are not used anymore. However, these methods may cause the system failure and lead to the loss of other users' data. Moreover, it cannot provide a fine granularity in data deletion. In fog computing, the devices do not return any convincing proof to the users, which makes it hard to check the deletion for requested data. Many storage systems remove the link to a file by changing the address to achieve data deletion, but the data is still accessible with another address. Logically deleted data can be regained by the technique of data recovery, thus assured data deletion cannot be confirmed.
The cryptography-based approaches are encrypting data then store them to cloud, thus, the data deletion problem under this circumstance can be transformed into secure erasure of the related secret keys. In 2005, Perman [24] first came up with an assured deletion proposal. In the system, when a user creates a file, he chooses an expiration time at the same time. After reaching the specified time, the trusted key manager, named Ephemerizer, will remove the ephemeral keys related to the expunged data, which makes data unrecoverable. However, it requires to determine in advance the expiration time of the key. Moreover, data deletion totally depends on the trusted Ephemerizer servers, which may lead to single point failures. In 2009, Geambasu et al. [25] proposed the vanish system, which is essential for the time-based assured deletion. It adopted the distributed key management leveraging secret sharing. In the system, the shares of the key are distributed to a peer-to-peer storage network. After some time, the shares will disappear from the P2P network, and users cannot obtain enough decryption keys, which leads to the message inaccessible. However, in the vanish system, the deletion is constrained by the node's update cycle, and Vanish cannot resist the Hopping attack and Sniffing attack. The Hopping ad-versary can change the port number from time to time to join the network to replicate the associated key components (usually 16-51 bytes). By sniffing, the components of a key in transit can be easily captured by the adversary. In 2012, Tang et al. [26] generalized the policy-based deletion. In their scheme, each file can be linked to a group of atomic policies. It defines multiple cryptographic key operations to achieve the security goals, including file upload and download, policy revocation, and policy renewal. By policy revocation, the key manager [27] removes the control key, which for data key encryption. Thus, the data key cannot be recovered, also the file corresponding to the policy is assured deleted. The flaw of the FADE is that the key managers need to perform complex decryption operations for each message, so it is not suitable for large, dynamic user scenarios. Perito and TSudik designed an assured deletion scheme [28] for embedded devices with limited memory. When users want to delete the content in the embedded device, they only need to modify the secure code, by which the data are all securely wiped and new code is downloaded. But it fails to achieve fine grained, flexible deletion. Mo et al. [29] presented a file deletion scheme by using a modulation tree and hash together with a modulator adjustment algorithm. In the scheme, all data keys that are for difficult files encryption that came from the same master key. When a specific key k needs to be removed, the master key will be replaced to make k unrecoverable. By running the modulator adjustment algorithm, other data keys are remain the same and are attainable from the new master key. Readon et al. [30] used B tree to fulfill the assured data deletion as well as access control, which are saved on a persistent storage together with the tree and by utilizing graph mutation, it realizes the goal of assured data deletion. But it needs to create the arborescent structure for the data.
Our Contributions. To meet the requirements of the secure data deletion and fine-grained access control, we put forward a ciphertext-policy-based assured deletion (CPAD) scheme. Smart objects are usually deployed for specific applications, for example, to restrict data accessibility by encrypting them with attributes owned by potential users. The access structure in the ciphertext can be sophisticated logic expressions on the attributes. In our protocol, considering that the smart objects are usually resource-limited and expensive, cryptographic tools may not be suitable to be deployed directly, thus data owners encrypt data via a secure symmetric encryption by a data key, that is also encrypted with an access structure to control the accessibility by data owners. The ciphertext of the data key as well as encrypted data are stored to the closest fog device. The fog device then keeps the ciphertext of data key but forwards the ciphertext of data to the cloud. We can realize the assured data deletion by attribute revocation such that none of the users are legal to the access structure when decrypting the ciphertext. Moreover, the fog device can respond a proof by which the smart object can verify that the data are deleted indeed. As a whole, we list the contributions of this paper into the following three aspects.
1) The proposed protocol achieves assured data deletion and flexible access control. Users are assigned a series of attributes. An access structure, that is easily constructed by any linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS), is built in a ciphertext. A user can get the correct plaintext only if the attributes owned by the user meet the access requirements of the ciphertext. Assured data deletion is achieved by revoking an attribute in the ciphertext. The fog device can return a proof, and the smart object is convinced that the data is deleted if the received proof is valid. 2) The proposed protocol can be proved secure under decisional q-parallel bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (BDHE) assumption. It is resistant against unauthorized users' collusion attack, that is, the collusion of unauthorized users cannot lead to the disclosure of data. Moreover, we remove the centralized trusted service, i.e., key manager, in our protocol. 3) We empirically evaluate the performance overhead of the proposed protocol, which demonstrates CPAD is efficient for the resource-limited fog devices. The implementation of the protocol shows the practicality of CPAD in the real-world applications. Roadmap: Section II provides some preliminaries that are the building blocks of CPAD. In Section III, we formalize the system model, security requirements, and the security model of the proposed protocol. Section IV presents the concrete construction of the protocol. The security analysis and implementation performance are shown in Sections V and VI, respectively. Section VII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We review some preliminaries including bilinear pairing and the cryptographic assumption used in the proposed protocol, access structure, and ABR.
A. Bilinear Pairing
Let p be a prime and groups G, G T denote multiplicative cyclic groups of order p. A bilinear pairing [32] constructed as e : G × G → G T maps a pair of elements in G to G T . For a bilinear map, these properties hold.
Bilinearity
Nondegeneracy. e does not map the generator g of group G to the identity 1 of group G T , that is e(g, g) = 1.
Efficient Computation. There exist efficient algorithms to compute e(h 1 , h 2 ).
B. Cryptographic Assumption
The advantage of an adversary A to distinguish e(g, g)
Decisional q-parallel bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption [33] states for any polynomial-time adversary, the aforementioned Adv A is negligible, whose proof is shown in [33] .
C. Access Structures
Define a group of n participants as P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, and Γ ⊆ 2 {P 1 ,P 2 ,...P n } is its nonempty subsets, where 2 P is the collection of all subsets of the participants. If Γ is monotone, that is, if A ∈ Γ, A ⊆ B, then B ∈ Γ, Γ is defined as an access structure on P . And the sets in Γ are authorized sets.
In our protocol, elements are identified by different attributes. The attributes that satisfy the access requirements are included in the access structure.
D. LSSSs
. . , P n } denotes a collection of all entities. Γ is an access structure on P . The master key space is S, and the space of subsecret keys are {S i }, i = 1, . . . , n. R is a random input set. A secret sharing scheme featured by the key distribution function Π is linear if 1) the space ofS i is a linear subspace of S; 2) the key distribution function Π : [34] enjoys the property that the reconstruction function is linear. Assume that Λ is an LSSS, and C is an authorized set. Let I be the set that I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ C}. Then, if {λ i } i∈I are shares of the secret s corresponding to the authorized set C, there are some constants {ω i ∈ Z p } i∈I such that i∈I ω i λ i = s. Note: (1, 0, 0 . . . , 0) is defined as the target vector in our protocol. According to [34] , any monotonic Boolean formula (including access formulas of binary trees) can be converted into an LSSS representation.
E. ABE
In 2005, the first ABE scheme was proposed in [35] where attributes are exploited to produce public/private key pairs for the users. According to whether the access structure is built in ciphertext or private keys, ABE algorithms are fell into two main categories, key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) schemes and ciphertext policy ABE (CP-ABE) schemes.
The first CP-ABE scheme was presented in [18] . CP-ABE can decide whether a user's private key can decipher a ciphertext, which addresses the issue of KP-ABE that data owners are not able to decide the recipients to access the data. Moreover, a users' private key corresponding to some attributes, so users that possess the designated attributes that match the access structure are able to gain the corresponding plaintext. Hence, CP-ABE is very close to the conventional access control framework and is suitable for quite a few real-world scenarios. 
III. MODELS AND REQUIREMENTS
In this part, we first present the system model for the fog-based assured data deletion. Then, we give the security requirements and security model of our CPAD scheme.
A. System Model
In the system model, there are many smart objects generating or collecting data. Smart things are connected to fog devices by a wireless access. Fog devices could be connected to each other and they are linked to the cloud as shown in Fig. 1 . There is an attribute authority (AA), who takes charge of the system initialization and attributes management in the system. AA publishes the system parameters that are needed in encryption and assigns private keys to the users. The cloud, which has powerful computing and storage resources, provides data storage, access control, and data processing services for users. The fog devices with sensors are going to sense data at the edge network, which also provide some basic services between fog devices and cloud centers. Fog nodes are defined as honest but curious, which means that they follow the protocols to fulfill the tasks assigned to them, but, they are curious to obtain some information about the data in the cloud. Smart objects, such as sensors or embedded devices in IoT, generate data then store the encrypted data to the fog devices and cloud. Smart objects cannot afford expensive computational operations due to the limited computing and storage capacity.
B. Security Requirements
We consider adversaries who want to learn information of the data that they have no right to access. The attackers can eavesdrop all the communications in the system, and unauthorized users may collude to decrypt the ciphertext. After the data is deleted, adversaries try to recover the deleted data. The adversaries here include both authorized users and unauthorized users. We assume fog devices are honest, hence, we do not consider attacks in which users collude with fog devices.
For the secure data storage and access, some basic security properties such as data confidentiality, availability, and integrity, should be guaranteed. Here, we consider two specific security goals that CPAD focus on: assured data deletion secure and fine-grained access control.
Secure fine-grained access control: As discussed previously, a fine-grained access control is always in demand and sometimes necessary in many applications. Data owners are willing to assign various access authorizations to different kinds of users. Only users with intended attributes that meet the access requirements can obtain the corresponding plaintext. Unauthorized entities will never get access to encrypted data even they collude with each other.
Assured data deletion: The data should be permanently inaccessible to users after assured deletion of data. A user cannot gain any knowledge of the deleted data even it can access the data previously. The fog devices should return a deletion proof with which the smart object can validate the deletion of data.
C. Security Model
Our model considers the selective access structure security, where the adversary outputs an access structure A * it wishes to be challenged upon at the beginning of the game, such that the data key encrypted under A * is deleted in the end. The adversary can make requests for the secret keys for several sets of attributes S, with the limitation that none of S satisfies A * . We define the security of the ciphertext-policy based assured data deletion scheme by using the following interactive game where a challenger C and an adversary A are involved.
Init: A determines an access structure A * in which the dummy attribute is revoked, meaning the data key encrypted with A * is deleted.
Setup: C sets the public parameters by executing the setup algorithm and forwards the public key P K to A.
Phase 1: A queries for the private keys corresponding to the attribute sets S i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ q 1 . The restriction for each query is that none of the attribute set S i satisfies A * . Since the attribute "dummy" is revoked, the set of attribute S i does not contain the attribute "dummy. 
IV. OUR CONSTRUCTION
We describe a concrete CPAD construction in this section that fulfills the properties of the assured data deletion and fine-grained data access by making use of CP-ABE. AA initializes the system and publishes system parameters. In our protocol, the universe of all the attributes in the system is denoted by a symbol U . There is an attribute "dummy," which is included in the set of attributes for each user and is an indispensable attribute in the access formula. Each smart object is preloaded with the public parameter P P and an LSSS access matrix M . The data generated by the smart object are encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm with a data key and the data key is encrypted with a ciphertext-policy ABE scheme. The smart object uploads the ciphertext of data and encrypted data key to a fog device, and deletes the local file. The fog device keeps the ciphertext of the data key, and transfers the ciphertext to the cloud. When the data generated by the smart objects need to be deleted, the smart object sends a deletion request to the fog device. The smart object and the fog device can agree on a secret deletion key via a key exchange protocol. By utilizing the deletion key, the fog device changes the ciphertext related to the attribute "dummy," which means the access structure in the ciphertext has changed, and the users who can decrypt the data previously cannot access the data anymore. The fog device then sends a deletion request to the cloud for deleting the ciphertext. It is fair to assume that the smart object can decrypt the data generated by itself. The smart object can verify the deletion with the deletion key. Our protocol is based on the Waters' ABE scheme [33] , and AA is not involved in the data deletion process. 
Setup(1 λ ). AA chooses two bilinear groups G and G T of prime order p. e : G × G → G T is a bilinear map and

KeyGen(MSK, S)
. AA takes as input the MSK and a set of the attributes S of a user, then randomly picks t ∈ Z p and computes as follows:
The algorithm outputs the private key of the user as:
The smart object and the fog device generate signing publicsecret key pair, respectively, as {spk, ssk} and {fpk, fsk} The signing algorithm can use short signature where a user or a fog device picks a random sec ∈ Z * p , and selects a hash function h 1 : {0, 1} * → G\{1}, after that it computes v = g sec . The spk is {v, h 1 }, and ssk is sec.
Encrypt(P P, (M, ρ), m, k).
The algorithm outputs the ciphertext of a message m. AS = (M, ρ) is an LSSS access structure where M is an l * n matrix, and M i denotes the vector composed by the ith row of M . ρ is a function that maps each row of M to different attributes. The smart object randomly chooses a symmetric key k and picks a file name fname ∈ Z p for the data. A symmetric encryption scheme is leveraged to encrypt users' data. {D} k represents the ciphertext of D where k is the data key. In order to encrypt the data key, the smart object chooses random values y 2 , . . . , y n ∈ Z p , which are components of the vector v = (s, y 2 , . . . , y n ) ∈ Z n p . The shares of the secret s are computed as
Then, the smart object computes and preserves τ = h(fname||k), and uploads {f name, spk, CT, {D} k , (M, ρ)} to a fog node. Upon receiving the data, the fog node uploads {f name, spk, {D} k } to the cloud.
Decrypt(CT, {D} k , SK): A user first downloads the ciphertext CT from the fog device and {D} k from the cloud. Suppose the set of attributes S owned by the user satisfies AS embedded in the ciphertext. Let I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}, then according to the properties of the LSSS, there exist the constants {ω i ∈ Z p } i∈I satisfying if {λ i } i∈I are valid shares of s, then i∈I ω i λ i = s. The decryption process is as follows:
αs .
The user computes k as k = C e(g,g) α s , and decrypts the data with k.
DelRequest(fname, x): x denotes the attribute "dummy". When the smart object wants to delete the file named fname on the fog device, it first chooses two random numbers q, u ∈ Z p , and computes θ = q u mod p. Then, the smart object sends the deletion request DR = {delete||fname|| x||q||θ, sign ssk (h(delete||fname||x||q||θ))} to the fog device.
ReEncrypt(CT, DR): Upon receiving the deletion request, the fog device checks the signature in DR. If it is correct, the fog device transmits the deletion request DR to the cloud. The cloud validates DR again. If the signature in DR is valid, the cloud deletes {D} k . The fog device picks a random v ∈ Z p , and computes η = q v (mod p) and γ = θ v (mod p). Then, the fog device updates the ciphertext D i in CT for the index i that and sends Resp = {η, sign f sk (η)} to the smart object.
Verify(Resp, CT ): Upon receiving the response Resp from the fog device, the smart object first validates the signature. If the signature is valid, the smart object computes γ = η u mod p, K x = K γ x , and retrieve the updated ciphertext of k, which is CT = {C, C , {C i , D i } 1≤i≤l } from the fog device. The smart object verifies the deletion as follows:
for , g) ats and k = CȦ e(C ,K ) . Finally, it calculates τ = h(fname||k ) and makes a comparison to τ . If τ = τ holds, the smart object is convinced that the ciphertext has been changed and the data are inaccessible.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the security of the proposed protocol in this part, which demonstrates all the properties mentioned in Section III are fulfilled.
A. Secure Fine-Grained Access Control
Secure fine-grained access control ensures that only authorized users can decrypt the ciphertext correctly. Authorized users are those who own the attributes that meet the requirements of the access structure built in the ciphertext. Even if the unauthorized users collude, they cannot learn any information from the ciphertext. In our protocol, data is encrypted with a symmetric encryption algorithm. The security of the data is guaranteed by the chosen secure symmetric encryption algorithm so that without the data key, the encrypted data are IND-secure. The encryption process is provably secure under the q-parallel BDHE assumption. The security proof is like the proof of Waters' scheme [33] and so we omit it here. Hence, if an adversary does not own the necessary attributes, it cannot decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the data key. Therefore, our protocol can make sure that only authorized users specified by the data owner have the ability to access the data.
B. Assured Data Deletion
Assured data deletion ensures the irrecoverability of the data when the data are deleted. Since the data key is encrypted with an access structure and when data needs to be deleted, the ciphertext of the data key is reencrypted, the new ciphertext cannot be decrypted correctly using the user's private key, thus, the data is irrecoverable.
When the data is deleted, the security of data key can be proved as follows. B chooses bilinear groups G and G T . g is a generator of group G. The challenger C chooses a random bit μ. If μ equals to zero, ( y, T ) is constructed as ( y, e(g, g) a q + 1 s ); Otherwise, C sets ( y, T ) = ( y, R) with a random R.
Theorem 1. Suppose the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption holds in groups G and G T , there is no adversary
Init: A outputs a challenge access structure (M * , ρ * ) on his own in which M * contains n * columns. The data key encrypted under the access structure is deleted in the end.
Setup: B chooses α ∈ Z p randomly, and sets e(g, g) α = e(g a , g a q )e(g, g) α that implicitly sets α = α + a q +1 . B randomly selects a value z x from Z p for each attribute. Let X be a scope of indices where ρ * (i) = x, which means that the ρ function may be not injective. Then, B programs h x as follows:
B gives response to secret key queries from A. Assume B receives a secret key query for a set of attributes S, which does not satisfy M * . The attribute "dummy" is not included in the scope of attributes S for the reason that the data have been deleted, the ciphertext corresponding to the attribute "dummy" is reencrypted, which leads to the key relevant to the attribute "dummy" is invalid. Hence, in the adversary's view, it has no knowledge about the corresponding key.
According to the properties of the LSSS, there is a vector ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω n * ) in which ω 1 = −1, and ω · M * i = 0 holds for all i that ρ * (i) ∈ S. A vector like this can be found in polynomial time. B randomly chooses r ∈ Z p and sets t as
Since g α is unknown, it seems hard to calculate K. However, according to the form of t and ω 1 = −1, there is a term g −a q + 1 included in g at , hence, g α can be canceled out when calculating K. B computes K as
For
For the x, which is used in the access structure, the terms of the form g 
. Let R i be the set of the other indices that map to the same attribute as row i, which means for an element k of Thus, the total advantage for B in this q-parallel BDHE game is 2 , which is nonnegligible.
For the reason that the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption holds in G and G T , the probability that A breaks the security of our protocol is negligible.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the computation and communication overheads of our scheme are analyzed by presenting the numeric results, and then, the implementation results are reported as well.
A. Numeric Analysis 1) Computation Cost:
In our protocol, AA generates users' private keys according to their attributes. Data are generated and encrypted by the smart object, and decrypted by the users. Data deletion is done by the fog devices. We present the computation cost from the viewpoint of the AA, the fog device, the smart object, and the user. For simplicity, M G and E G denote the multiplication and exponentiation in group G, and M G T and E G T denote the multiplication and exponentiation in group G T . Denote P the pairing computation. We ignore the computation cost of hash functions since it is highly efficient compared to other expensive operations.
AA generates public parameters and private keys for users. Assume a user owns s attributes, the computation cost of AA is (s + 2)E G + 1M G . The primary computation for the smart object is to generate the ciphertext of the data key as the cost of the symmetric encryption is little. For M , which is a sharegenerating matrix containing l rows, the dominated cost of the smart object is 3lE G + lM G + 1P + 1M G T . The main computation of users is decrypting the encrypted data key. Suppose that the number of the rows in M mapped to the attributes satisfying the access structure is i, the computation cost of the user is
Regarding data deletion, the computation cost of the fog device is two exponentiations in Z p and one exponentiation in G. When validating a deletion proof, the cost of the smart object is
where i is the number of the rows in M that corresponds to the attributes of the smart object.
2) Communication Cost: After encryption, the smart object uploads the {f name, spk, CT, {D} k , (M, ρ)} to the fog device. The size of {D} k is related to the data since data are encrypted with symmetric encryption. The ciphertext size of the data key is O(l), where l denotes the size of an access formula. During the deletion process, the deletion request contains four group elements in Z p . The deletion proof returned from the fog device includes two group elements in Z p . In the verification phase, the smart object needs to retrieve the ciphertext of the data key whose size is O(l), where l represents the size of the access formula in the ciphertext.
B. Implementation
In our implementation, we leverage the cryptographic hash function SHA-1 and choose AES as the data encryption algorithm. The experiments were conducted with Miracl library [36] on Intel i5-2450 MQ CPU at 2.50 GHz. The size of AES keys is 128 bits. Considering the security and efficiency of the scheme, we set the security level as 80.
Since the dominated computation of the smart object is encrypting the data key, we test the cost of encryption by increasing the size of the access formula in the ciphertext. Specifically, we increase the parameters of the share-generating matrix, l and n, simultaneously from 10 to 50 with a step for 10 and record the time cost. We observe that the encryption time rises almost linearly as the size of the access formula grows. As shown in Fig. 2 , when there are 50 rows in M , the time cost for encryption is about 150 ms, which is acceptable for the smart object. From Fig. 3 , we can see that the time consumption for AA that computes private keys for a user is quite small. When the user owns ten attributes, the time cost of AA is almost 28 ms. For the user, the decryption time increases with the number of attributes of the user. More specifically, the time cost is linear with the number of the rows in M , which is determined by the number of the user's attributes. The time cost is approximately 180 ms if there are ten attributes for a user.
During the data deletion process, the time to generate the deletion request for the smart object is small since there is only one exponentiation computation. On the fog device side, the time cost of producing a proof is also very small, since the fog device only needs to perform three exponentiation operations. The main cost of the smart object is to verify the proof returned from the fog device, which is almost the same as the decryption cost. Fortunately, it is a one-time computation for a unique file. As shown in Fig. 4 , it consumes about 115, 144, and 180 ms, respectively, if the smart object has 6, 8, and 10 attributes, which is bearable to the smart object.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated an essential but challenging issue of the assured deletion of data with the fine-grained access control in fog-based industrial applications. To solve the problem, we proposed a new protocol called CPAD, in which smart objects encrypt the data with an access structure and only authorized users who possess the designated attributes can decrypt it correctly. When receiving a deletion request, the fog device can do the operations such that none of the users can recover the data key, which makes data irrecoverable. Moreover, CPAD is resilient against the unauthorized user colluding attacks. The implementations show our protocol can be adopted in real-world applications.
